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I. INTRODUCTION
In this article, we will briefly summarize the holding of Edgewood
Independent School District v. Kirby' from the perspective of those
who wrote the pleadings, developed the evidence, defined the legal
theories, and argued the case. We foresee numerous articles on the
holding of the case, so we concentrate here on one particular aspect of
the decision: the application of the Edgewood holding to other rights,
privileges, and responsibilities stated or implied in the Texas
Constitution.
A. The Texas School Finance System
Of primary importance is Edgewood's recognition that the Texas
public school finance system, as a whole, must accord with the Texas
Constitution's requirements.2 As defined by the district court and
affirmed by the Texas Supreme Court, these requirements are that the
school finance system fulfill the Texas Constitution's "efficiency"
mandate of article VII, section 1.1 The Texas Supreme Court rejected
outright the defendants'4 efforts to limit the courts' inquiry to the
school funding structure outlined in chapter 16 of the Texas Educa-
tion Code.5
1. 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989).
2. Id. at 393.
3. Id.
4. The defendants were: William N. Kirby, Texas Commissioner of Education, Texas
State Board of Education, Gov. William Clements, Comptroller Robert Bullock, and Attorney
General Jim Mattox. Kirby v. Edgewood Indep. School Dist., 761 S.W.2d 859, 860 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1988), rev'd, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989).
5. Edgewood, 777 S.W.2d at 394-95 (state interpreted efficiency mandate as requiring in-
expensive system); see also TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 16.01-16.975 (Vernon 1972 & Supp.
1990) (mechanism for funding public schools). In addition to rejecting the defendants' argu-
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The Edgewood decision will force a change in the school funding
structure. Currently, a combination of federal, state and local monies
fund public education in Texas.6 Federal funding supports specific
programs within school districts.7 State aid, meanwhile, is distributed
via complicated formulas from Texas' two sources of educational
funding, the permanent school fund and the general revenue fund.8
Finally, local aid flows from property taxes levied by and for individ-
ual school districts.'
The Texas Legislature has periodically considered and revised the
formulas by which state general revenue funds are distributed to
school districts.10 Prior to Edgewood, the last major revision in the
state's funding formulas took shape in a law popularly known by its
house bill number, "House Bill 72." Unfortunately, the state's
formula-based funding system was not able to compensate for the
vastly different abilities of school districts to raise money for their
students.
12
In the record before the Edgewood court, a district's property value
per student directly affected its ability to raise money.13 For example,
a district with $20,000 in property value per student received two dol-
lars per student for each one-cent increase in the tax rate, while a
district with $1,000,000 in property value per student could raise $100
per student with each one-cent tax increase. In fiscal 1985-86, for
example, property value per student ranged from $20,000 per student
in the poorest school district to $14,000,000 per student in the richest
ment that the constitution mandated a cheap funding system, the Texas Supreme Court also
rebuffed the defendants' theory that fiscal expenditures do not affect educational quality. See
Brief for the State of Texas at 25, Edgewood Indep. School Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391
(Tex. 1989) (contending educational quality unaffected by amount of money spent).
6. Edgewood Indep. School Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 392 (Tex. 1989). The state
supplied 42% of education funds, while school districts supplied 50%. Id. The federal gov-
ernment supplied the remainder. Id.
7. See Edgewood, 777 S.W.2d at 391-392. Almost half of the federal funds pay school
districts to provide free and reduced cost meals to low-income children. The remaining federal
funds pay for supplemental and experimental projects. Id.
8. See id. at 392 (aid distributed to school districts through Foundation School Program);
TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 15.01-15.011 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
9. Id.
10. Id. at 397.
11. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 16.001 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
12. See Edgewood Indep. School Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 397 (Tex. 1989) (legisla-
ture has made good faith efforts to improve system, but has failed).
13. See id. at 392 (districts face glaring disparity in ability to raise funds through property
taxes).
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district.14 Thus, for each fifty-cent tax increase, the poorest school
district raised $100 per student, while the richest district received
$70,000 per student.
The state's funding formulas were designed to compensate for the
inferior fundraising abilities of property-poor school districts.I5 How-
ever, state aid never actually offset the incredible differences in school
districts' abilities to raise money through property taxes.16 From this
basic inequality, Edgewood Independent School District v. Kirby 7 was
born.
B. The District Court's Decision
On June 1, 1987, District Judge Harley Clark of the 250th District
found the Texas school finance system violated the Texas Constitu-
tion and entered a declaratory judgment granting injunctive relief to
the Edgewood Independent School District and its fellow plaintiffs.' 8
Three months later, Judge Clark filed extensive findings of fact and
conclusions of law.' 9
Judge Clark's judgment indicted the Texas school finance system
for enforcing, rather than ameliorating, inequalities between students
in property-rich and property-poor districts. Wrote Judge Clark:
[l]t [Texas' school finance system] fails to insure that each school dis-
trict in this state has the same ability as every other district to obtain, by
state legislative appropriation or by local taxation or both, funds for
educational expenditures, including facilities and equipment, such that
each student, by and through his or her school district, would have the
same opportunity to educational funds as every other student in the
state, limited only by discretion given local districts to set local tax
rates, provided this does not prohibit the State from taking into consid-
eration the legitimate district and student needs and district and student
14. Id.
15. See id. (state has attempted to lessen local funding disparities).
16. Id. at 397.
17. Id. at 391.
18. Edgewood Indep. School Dist. v. Kirby, No. 362, 516 (Dist. Ct. of Travis County,
250th Judicial Dist. of Texas, June 1, 1987), rev'd, 761 S.W.2d 859 (Tex. App.-Austin 1988),
rev'd, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989). In addition to the Edgewood Independent School District,
the plaintiffs included other property-poor school districts, as well as individual students and
their parents. Edgewood, 777 S.W.2d at 392. The parents included Demetrio Rodriguez, the
name plaintiff in Edgewood's precursor, Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep. School Dist., 411
U.S. 1 (1973).
19. Record at 536, Edgewood (No. 362, 516).
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cost differences associated with providing a public education.2"
Of pivotal importance in Judge Clark's analysis was the interaction
between state financing formulas and school district boundaries.
Judge Clark found that "Texas Education Code § 16.01 et seq. [was]
implemented in conjunction with local school district boundaries that
contain unequal taxable property wealth for the financing of public
education."' 2 1 For the remainder of the litigation, this interrelation-
ship between state and local aid was a central issue.
1. Declaratory Judgment
The declaratory judgment found that Texas' system of school fi-
nance violated sections 3, 3a, 19 and 29 of article I of the Texas Con-
stitution.22 Translated, this meant that the finance system denied
equal protection of the law, equality under the law, and privileges and
immunities to the plaintiffs and the more than one million school chil-
dren in property-poor school districts across Texas.2 3 The court also
found that the finance system violated the efficiency clause found in
article VII, section 1 of the Texas Constitution.24
2. The Injunction
The injunction restrained Texas Commissioner of Education Wil-
liam N. Kirby, the Texas State Board of Education, Comptroller
Robert Bullock and their successors from financing public education
in Texas according to the system contained in chapter 16 of the Texas
Education Code.25 The court then stayed its injunction until Septem-
ber 1, 1989, to give the state time to enact a constitutionally sufficient
plan.26 The court also gave the state until 1990 to begin implementing
the new school funding plan. 7
20. Id. at 502.
21. Id. at 502.
22. Id. at 503.
23. Id at 503, 548.
24. Id. at 503.
25. Id. at 504.
26. Id.
27. Id. To ensure that the decision would not affect the school bond market, the district
court granted extensive relief to bond holders in school districts. Id. at 505. The court also
found that the plaintiffs and plaintiff-intervenors were entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees,
but found that sovereign immunity barred the awarding of these fees. Id. at 506-07. The court
further found that the Texas school finance system did not discriminate against Mexican
Americans. Perhaps most importantly, the court retained jurisdiction of the case. Id. at 507.
[Vol. 22:69
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3. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
The court's findings of fact and conclusions of law were not seri-
ously disputed by the defendants in the case and were not disturbed
by the Austin Court of Appeals or the Texas Supreme Court, both of
which relied on the district court's findings without question.28 The
district court's findings of fact addressed the following issues:
1. Education as a fundamental interest in Texas;
2. An overview of the school finance system;
3. Wealth disparities;
4. Variations in expenditures;
5. Variations in tax rates and the ability to raise funds at certain tax rates;
6. Effects of wealth differences on expenditures in taxes;
7. Effects of insufficient taxes;
8. School facilities;
9. Concentration of low-income students in low-wealth school districts;
10. Historical inequities;
11. How the foundation school program formulas deny equality of access
to education funds;
12. District boundaries; and
13. Efficiencies of the present system.29
a. Equal Protection
Building on the detailed record, the district court concluded as a
matter of law that education is a fundamental right under the Texas
Constitution.30 The court also found that wealth is a suspect category
in the context of a school finance system. 3' Therefore, the court de-
termined that the state's school finance system should be subjected to
strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause of the Texas Consti-
tution and that the system could be justified only by the state's show-
ing of a compelling interest.32
The defendants had attempted to justify the system by concentrat-
28. See Edgewood Indep. School Dist. v. Kirby, 761 S.W.2d 859, 860-62 (Tex. App.-
Austin 1988), rev'd, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989); see also Edgewood Indep. School Dist. v.
Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 392-94 (Tex. 1989).
29. Edgewood Indep. School Dist. v. Kirby, No. 362, 516 (Dist. Ct. of Travis County,
250th Judicial Dist. of Texas, June 1, 1987), rev'd, 761 S.W.2d 859 (Tex. App.-Austin 1988),
rev'd, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989).
30. Record at 539-48, Edgewood (No. 362, 516).
31. Id. at 542.
32. Id. at 545.
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ing on the issues of local control and preservation of community of
interest.33 The court found neither of these justifications sufficient to
overcome the system's strongly negative impact on students in low-
wealth districts.34 As a result, the system was found to violate the
equal protection clause of the Texas Constitution.35
The district court also found that the system violated the Texas
Constitution at the lowest level of equal protection scrutiny.3 6 Apply-
ing the rational relationship test to the finance system, the court found
no rational or substantially justified basis for funding public education
through a combination of state aid and local property taxes.37
b. The Efficiency Argument
The court concluded that section 1 of article VII of the Texas Con-
stitution requires the state to maintain a cost-efficient system of free
public schools a.3  The efficiency holding was based on the court's find-
ing that Texas' school finance system wasted money in myriad ways.39
According to the court, waste occurred for a variety of reasons, in-
cluding the fact that some school districts had been created as tax
havens.' Additionally, funding formulas sent unnecessary monies to
wealthy districts, district boundaries were not drawn to effectively
and efficiently use the property wealth of the state, and very small or
very poor districts were inefficient because of the lack of wealth.4 1
This efficiency holding later became the basis of the Texas Supreme
Court's decision to overturn the state's method of public school
financing.42
33. Id. at 575, 591.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 502-03.
36, Id.
37, Id. at 538-39.
38. Id. at 503.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 573.
41. Id.
42. See Edgewood Indep. School Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 397 (Tex. 1989) (school
financing system not efficient as required by article VII, section 1 of Texas Constitution).
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C. The Court of Appeals
1. The Majority Opinion
The Austin Court of Appeals reversed the district court decision
4 3
after determining that the school finance system should be examined
according to the rational relationship test, not strict scrutiny, under
the equal protection clause of the Texas Constitution." In so doing,
the appellate court repudiated the district court's finding that educa-
tion is a fundamental right under the Texas Constitution.45
Although education is vitally important and a "primary vehicle for
transmitting the values upon which our society rests,"' the appellate
court found that education is not "included in the limited category of
fundamental rights that reach constitutional dimensions. ' 4  The
court then limited fundamental rights to those specifically mentioned
in the Texas Bill of Rights, in particular, freedom of speech and
religion. 8
The district court's other means of utilizing strict scrutiny-the
finding of wealth as a suspect category-was also overturned by the
appellate court.49 The appellate court's analysis of the issue cited San
Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez,50 the United States Supreme
Court case that was the precursor to Edgewood and that found that
wealth was not a suspect class under the United States Constitution.'
"Our analysis under the Texas Constitution reaches no different re-
sult," the appellate court stated. 52
Having eliminated the fundamental right and suspect class issues
that would have elevated the level of scrutiny, the appellate court was
free to analyze the school finance system according to the rational
relationship test.53 Recognizing local control of education as one of
43. Id.
44. Id. at 864.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 863.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 862-63.
49. Id. at 864.
50. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). The Court in Rodriguez held that the Texas school finance system
did not disadvantage any suspect class or interfere with the exercise of a "fundamental" right.
Id. at 28, 37-39.
51. Id. at 28.
52. Kirby v. Edgewood Indep. School Dist., 761 S.W.2d 859, 864 (Tex. App.-Austin
1988), rev'd, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989).
53. Id. at 864.
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the state's goals, the court found that the use of property taxes to
partially finance public education enables greater local control.'
Therefore, the court stated, the finance system is rationally related to
local control of education."
The court also approved the state's argument that the school fi-
nance system was authorized by article VII, section 3 of the Texas
Constitution, s6 which enables the Texas Legislature to create school
districts and to allow those school districts to tax. 7 Analyzing the
constitution according to the rules of constitutional construction, the
court determined that the framers of the Texas Constitution intended
to let the legislature give school districts the power to raise local reve-
nues based on property taxes."'
The appellate court declined to review the plaintiffs' argument that
the school finance system violated the efficiency clause of article VII,
section 1 of the Texas Constitution.5 9 The issue of efficiency, the
court held, was a political question unsuitable for review."
2. The Dissent
Judge Gammage dissented, concluding that education is a funda-
mental right under the Texas Constitution and that wealth is a sus-
pect class.6' Judge Gammage also determined that the history of the
1876 Texas Constitution supported these conclusions.62 He next ar-
gued that article VII, section 3 and article I, sections 3 and 3a of the
Texas Constitution could be harmonized and interpreted as requiring
the state to demonstrate a compelling reason for the disparate funding
of Texas school districts.63 The state, Judge Gammage would have
found, could not support this burden.6
Unlike the majority, Judge Gammage found that article VII, sec-
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 866.
57. TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 3.
58. Kirby v Edgewood Indep. School Dist., 761 S.W.2d 859, 864-66 (Tex. App. - Austin
1988), rev'd, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989).
59. Id. at 867.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 867 (Gammage, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 867-75 (Gammage, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 874 (Gammage, J., dissenting).
64. Id. (Gammage, J., dissenting).
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tion 1 of the Texas Constitution was amenable to traditional review.6"
He also concluded that the meaning of efficiency, as referred to in
article VII, section 1 and as applied to school finance, could be de-
fined as "'efficient enough' to preserve protected constitutional rights
in accordance with necessary, discernible and manageable legal stan-
dards."" Because the school finance system did not preserve such
rights, Judge Gammage agreed with the trial court that the system
violated the "efficiency clause" in article VII, section 1.17
D. The Texas Supreme Court Decision
Edgewood Independent School District v. Kirby is among the leading
Texas cases on the meaning of the Texas Constitution. It is also the
leading decision on the construction of the "efficiency clause" in arti-
cle VII, section 1 of the constitution.
The Texas Supreme Court rejected the appellate court's determina-
tion that article VII, section 1 was not amenable to judicial review.68
Instead, the court found it had a duty to construe section l's terms-
which included "efficiency," "suitable," and "essential"-even
though these terms were not precise. 69 According to the court, this
duty sprung from the challenge to a state system which allegedly vio-
lated strong, but general, constitutional demands.7"
The court began its interpretation by summarizing the disparities
caused by the school finance system. 71 It then stated it would con-
sider the intent of those who had adopted the efficiency clause in arti-
cle VII, section 1.72 The court also noted its duty to interpret the
constitution as "an organic document to govern society and institu-
tions as they evolve through time.
' 71
By studying sources dating from the 1876 Constitution to the 1883
amendments, the court concluded that the term "efficiency" in the
Texas Constitution is synonymous with non-wasteful and productive
65. Id. at 875 (Gammage, J., dissenting).
66. Id. (Gammage, J., dissenting)
67. Id. (Gammage, J., dissenting).
68. Edgewood Indep. School Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 394 (Tex. 1989).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 392-93.
72. Id. at 394.
73. Id.
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effects. 4 In so concluding, the court repudiated the defendants' inter-
pretations of efficiency as meaning "cheap" or "inexpensive."75
Based on this historical, contextual and practical analysis, the court
concluded that the system violated article VII requirements that the
legislature provide for a "general diffusion of knowledge" and an effi-
cient system of education.76 The court also set a strong standard for
the school finance system and mandated that the Texas Legislature
fashion a remedy before May 1, 1990.7 The court held that:
there must be a direct and close correlation between a district's tax ef-
fort and the educational resources available to it; in other words, dis-
tricts must have substantially equal access to similar revenues per pupil
at similar levels of tax effort. Children who live in poor districts and
children who live in rich districts must be afforded a substantially equal
opportunity to have access to educational funds.7
The court further stated that:
[a] band-aid will not suffice; the system itself must be changed.... A
remedy is long overdue. The legislature must take immediate action.79
With this, the court rejected the defendants' arguments that the pres-
ent system is mandated by the need for local control of education and
the constitutional creation of school districts and their legislatively
controlled power to tax.8 °
II. EQUAL PROTECTION
A. Equal Protection in Edgewood
The Texas Supreme Court decision in Edgewood did not openly dis-
cuss equal protection, but it analyzed the case in much the same way
that an equal protection case would be resolved. The court's analysis
will be important in future litigation when this decision is applied to
other aspects of education as well as to other rights under the state
constitution.
74. Id. at 395.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 397.
77. Id. at 399. The Texas Supreme Court stayed the effect of the trial court's injunction
until May 1, 1990, but made it clear that "[a] remedy is long overdue. The legislature must
take immediate action." Id.
78. Id. at 397.
79. Id. at 397-99.
80. Id. at 398.
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The Edgewood trial court decided the case on equal protection
grounds.8' The court of appeals overturned the decision based on a
rejection of the use of equal protection in the area of education.82
Though the court of appeals acknowledged the inequities in the edu-
cational system, it refused to allow the courts and the Constitution to
create a remedy.
8 3
While the Supreme Court reversed the appeals court and affirmed
the trial court, it did not openly resolve the equal protection issues."
However, the Supreme Court decided the case based on equal protec-
tion considerations.85
The Supreme Court's discussion of the Texas educational system
left no doubt as to the tremendous inequalities in education. The
court based its decision on only one of the three provisions upon
which the trial court had depended. 6 Without reaching a conclusion
that a fundamental right or a suspect class had been affected, the
court decided the case solely on the education efficiency provision of
article VII, section 1.87 "Because we have decided that the school
financing system violates the Texas Constitution's 'efficiency' provi-
sion, we need not consider petitioner's other constitutional
argument."8 8
The door is left open, however, for a later interpretation either that
equal opportunity for education is a fundamental right or that wealth
is a suspect class. First, the Supreme Court did not decide that educa-
tion was not a fundamental right, nor that wealth was not a suspect
class. Secondly, the decision presented a view of the Constitution as a
document which should be interpreted in view of current conditions.8 9
Thirdly, the reasoning used by the Supreme Court is logically based
on the same analysis used in equal protection cases.
81. Record at 503, Edgewood (No. 362, 516).
82. Kirby v. Edgewood Indep. School Dist., 761 S.W.2d 859, 864 (Tex. App. - Austin
1988), rev'd, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989).
83. Id. at 867.
84. Edgewood Indep. School Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 398-99 (Tex. 1989).
85. Id. at 393, 397-98.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 398.
89. Id. at 396-99.
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1. Use of Judicial Restraint
The final Edgewood decision did not reach the equal protection is-
sues directly. By basing the holding on the "efficiency" clause, the
court did not create a precedent of refusing to apply strict scrutiny in
the field of education. Rather, the court exercised judicial restraint.
A principle of proper constitutional interpretation is to avoid a
finding of unconstitutionality if the court can find a remedy at a lower
level of law, such as a change in a statute.9' This principle arises from
the doctrine of judicial restraint, which takes form in other ways, such
as the case and controversy requirement, refusals to make advisory
decisions, and rules of justiciability, clarity and timeliness. 91 Here,
the Edgewood court was able to mandate a remedy for educational
inequality by basing its decision on a less fundamental section of the
Texas Constitution.
92
The Texas Constitution encompasses both basic rights and statu-
tory material. For example, article I contains the Texas Bill of
Rights, 9 yet article III, section 47 authorizes bingo.
94
Even within the education article, fundamental and nonfunda-
mental rights are implicated.95 The efficiency of education clause in
the Texas Constitution does not reach as deeply as the beginning of
that same sentence in article VII, section 1 which states that "[a] gen-
eral diffusion of knowledge being essential to the preservation of the
liberties and rights of the people.... 96 Judicial restraint would seem
to dictate state court interpretation of a state constitution with the
holding based on the narrowest grounds possible. Judicial restraint
can explain why the Supreme Court decided Edgewood under one
part of article VII, section 1, and did not reach the other part of the
90. Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936)(Brandeis, J., concurring) (citing Crow-
ell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)). "When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn
in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principal
that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by
which the question may be avoided." Crowell, 285 U.S. at 62.
91. See Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 568-75 (1947) (contains a de-
scriptive history of the origins of the judicial restraint doctrine).
92. Edgewood Indep. School Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 397 (Tex. 1989).
93. TEX. CONST. art. I.
94. TEX. CONST. art. III, § 47.
95. TEX. CONST. art. VII. The fundamental right implicated is equality of opportunity
for education. Although this has not been found to be a fundamental right in Texas, we argue
that the Texas Constitution provides for it.
96. TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1.
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same section which implicated fundamental rights and suspect
classes.
Additionally, judicial restraint protects the separation of govern-
ment branches.97 The Texas Supreme Court interpreted the Constitu-
tion but left the fashioning of the particular remedy to the Texas
Legislature.9" It may be, however, that a later decision will reach fun-
damental rights if, for example, the legislature refuses to correct the
unequal educational financing system and the remedy must be fash-
ioned by the judiciary.99
2. An Organic Document
That it would be possible for a later decision to reach fundamental
rights or a suspect class is also suggested by the court's willingness to
interpret the Constitution in the light of present day conditions. The
use of the words "organic" and "evolve" indicate a constitutional in-
terpretation which takes into account more than the plain language of
the document or the framers' and ratifiers' views. "We seek its mean-
ing [of article VII, section 1] with the understanding that the Consti-
tution was ratified to function as an organic document to govern
society and institutions as they evolve through time.""bo °
3. Elements of Equal Protection Analysis
The most revealing factor in the Supreme Court's decision was that
the reasoning followed equal protection analysis. 10' In order to thor-
oughly analyze the court's decision in terms of equal protection, the
groundwork of what is federal and state equal protection will be set
out first.
97. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 992-97 (1974) (discusses court's role in
separation of the judiciary and the executive branches).
98. Edgewood Indep. School Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 399 (Tex. 1989).
99. In the summer of 1990, a trial was held on the allegations of the plaintiffs, poor
districts, that the new school finance bill did not meet the Supreme Court mandate to make the
school finance system efficient and equitable. On September 25, 1990, Travis Country District
Judge Scott McCown held that the new school finance bill was unconstitutional. Judge Mc-
Cown gave the Legislature until September 1, 1991 to enact a more equitable and efficient
school finance law.
100. Edgewood Indep. School Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 394 (Tex. 1989).
101. This analysis is specifically directed to the determination of whether a right is funda-
mental under the Texas Constitution in an equal protection case. We assume the analysis can
also be applied to whether the right is fundamental in other areas.
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B. The Three Levels of Review Under Both State and Federal
Analyses
1. Federal Analysis
There are roughly three standards under which government action
is scrutinized in the area of equal protection. The standards affect
whether the burden of proof is shifted and what level of state interest
is required. Historically, the rational and strict scrutiny standards
evolved first. In the rational relationship test, the courts validate gov-
ernment classifications or statutes which impinge on a constitutional
right if a rational connection can be shown between the classification
or statute and the state interest furthered by the classification or stat-
ute. The rational relationship test has been used for cases interpreting
social and economic legislation. 0 2 It is a very lax standard.
In the area of economics and social welfare, a State does not violate the
Equal Protection Clause merely because the classification made by its
laws are imperfect. If the classification has some "reasonable basis," it
does not offend the Constitution simply because the classification "is
not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in
some inequality." "The problems of government are practical ones and
may justify, if they do not require, rough accommodations-illogical, it
may be, and unscientific." "A statutory discrimination will not be set
aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it."'0 3
The most exacting standard applied to a government classification
or statute is the strict scrutiny standard. The strict scrutiny standard
is applied when a suspect classification has been made or when a fun-
damental right is impinged upon. The government then has the bur-
den of proof that the classification or statute furthers a compelling
state interest. 11 As the rational and strict scrutiny standards for
equal protection and fundamental rights developed, the problems
with such a rigid structure were made apparent.
The United States Supreme Court reacted to the limitations of the
102. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938). "[But] the existence
of facts supporting the legislative judgment is to be presumed, for regulatory legislation affect-
ing ordinary commercial transactions is not to be pronounced unconstitutional, unless in light
of the facts made known or generally assumed it is of such a character as to preclude the
assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge and experience of the
legislators .. " Id.
103. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) (citations omitted).
104. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964) (classification based upon race
violates equal protection).
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"two-tiered" analysis by developing a system of "intermediate scru-
tiny." 105 The mid-level review in federal courts involves a quasi-sus-
pect classification, and the government has the burden to prove that
the classification bears a substantial relationship to an important state
interest. It was first used for gender classifications."o The intermedi-
ate standard has also been applied to classifications of illegitimacy, 107
some aspects of alienage, 108 and mental retardation.1"
In Edgewood, the plaintiffs sought to establish that education is a
fundamental right and that wealth is a suspect category. 1 Either of
these two arguments would have triggered the strict scrutiny standard
and forced the government to prove that a compelling interest was
advanced by the current school financing system.
2. The Federal Equal Protection Analysis as Applied to
Education
The federal precedent most on point for the Edgewood case is San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez.1 ' Based on an im-
plicit/explicit test, the United States Supreme Court held in Rodri-
guez that education was not a fundamental right.' 12 Because the
federal constitution does not specifically mention education, reasoned
the court, education is not explicitly guaranteed. 13 The possibility of
finding education implicitly protected by the United States Constitu-
tion was rejected summarily despite a recognition of the importance
105. See Gunther, Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on A Changing Court: A
Model For a New Equal Proctection, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1, 20-87 (1972).
106. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (using rational basis test to invalidate Idaho
statute preferring male over equally qualified female to serve as administrator of estate); Fron-
tiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973) (openly departed from the traditional rational
basis standard with respect to gender).
107. Weber v. Aetna Casualty and Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 173 (1972) (invalidated work-
ers compensation law denying benefits to unacknowledged illegitimates).
108. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 104-05 (1976) (denial of federal employ-
ment to aliens must be justified by reasons of concern to government agency, not administra-
tive convenience).
109. Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985) (used rational basis
test as though it were intermediate standard to hold unconstitutional refusal to permit con-
struction of home for mentally retarded on basis of zoning, while directly rejecting quasi-
suspect classification).
110. Record at 539, 562-65, Edgewood (No. 362, 516).
111. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
112. Id. at 35.
113. Id. at 35-36.
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of education in comparison to and in connection with other federally
protected rights.
Thus, the key to discovering whether education is "fundamental" is
not to be found in comparisons of the relative societal significance of
education as opposed to subsistence or housing. Nor is it to be found by
weighing whether education is as important as the right to travel.
Rather, the answer lies in assessing whether there is a right to education
explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution.
Education, of course, is not among the rights afforded explicit protec-
tion under our Federal Constitution. Nor do we find any basis for say-
ing it is implicitly so protected. As we have said, the undisputed
importance of education will not alone cause this Court to depart from
the usual standard for reviewing a State's social and economic
legislation. 14
The Rodriguez Court rejected an argument based on the nexus be-
tween education and other fundamental rights.'1 5 The nexus argu-
ment is that education is important in order for people to be able to
exercise other federally protected rights. As Justice Powell in Rodri-
guez explained,
It is the appellees' contention, however, that education is distinguish-
able from other services and benefits provided by the State because it
bears a peculiarly close relationship to other rights and liberties ac-
corded protection under the Constitution. Specifically, they insist that
education is itself a fundamental personal right because it is essential to
the effective exercise of first amendment freedoms and to the intelligent
utilization of the right to vote." 6
The Supreme Court rejected the nexus test by stating that although
the challenged right may be important to the exercise of other funda-
mental rights, the United States Constitution guarantees only a lack
of government interference in people's lives.' 7 In the same vein, the
Court also spoke of the concern to protect federalism by keeping the
federal judiciary out of states' legislative activities." s
114. Id. at 33-35 (citations omitted).
115. Id at 36-39.
116. Id. at 35.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 35-36.
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3. The Federal Intermediate Test as Applied to Education
Education has a history of mid-level review on the federal level.
The United States Supreme Court looked at a Texas statute chal-
lenged under the equal protection clause in Plyler v. Doe.'1 9 The case
invalidated section 21.031 of the Texas Education Code which denied
a free public education to children of illegally admitted aliens.1 20 The
Plyler court noted that, although education was not a "right" guaran-
teed under the United States Constitution,
neither is it merely some governmental "benefit" indistinguishable from
other forms of social welfare legislation. Both the importance of educa-
tion in maintaining our basic institutions, and the lasting impact of its
deprivation on the life of the child, mark the distinction.... 121
In determining the rationality of section 21.031, we may appropri-
ately take into account its costs to the Nation and to the innocent chil-
dren who are its victims. In light of these countervailing costs, the
discrimination ... can hardly be considered rational unless it furthers
some substantial goal of the State.
1 22
Thus, Plyler establishes, post-Rodriguez, a middle level of scrutiny
for the federal equal protection analysis of education-related classifi-
cations. Plyler clearly states that education should not fall within the
general rules for interpreting social and economic legislation.
Another recent United States Supreme Court case makes clear that
Rodriguez did not permanently settle the application of the federal
equal protection clause to state school financing challenges. Papasan
v. Allain123 points to the continuing vitality of the federal equal pro-
tection clause to close scrutiny of those parts of the school finance
system which are under state control.
However, the Texas courts need not depend on federal precedent
because the interpretation of the protections or rights found in the
Texas Constitution can extend beyond the interpretation of the
United States Constitution.
124
119. 457 U.S. 202, 205 (1982).
120. Id. at 230.
121. Id. at 221.
122. Id. at 223-24.
123. 478 U.S. 265 (1986) (equal protection claim based on unequal distribution of benefits
from state land not barred by eleventh amendment).
124. Duncan, Terminating the Guardianship: A New Role for State Courts, 19 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 809, 838-45 (1988).
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4. State Analysis: Comparing Texas and Federal Equal Rights
The Texas Constitution differs from the United States Constitution
in history, language and judicial interpretation. 25 This is especially
true in regard to the state and federal equal protection clauses.
a. Legislative History
The Texas Constitution was derived from its own independent, na-
tional constitution.' 26 The Texas equal protection provision has a
longer history than the federal clause, which is contained in the four-
teenth amendment. The Texas provision was enacted thirty years
before the federal equal protection clause.
27
b. Language
The language of the Texas provision includes both an affirmative
clause ("all free men ... have equal rights") and a negative prohibi-
tion ("no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public
emoluments, or privileges").' 2  The fourteenth amendment to the
United States Constitution is phrased only in the negative: "No State
shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec-
tion of the laws."'
129
c. Case History
A state constitution can both grant additional rights and respect
the rights protected by the federal constitution. 30
While state constitutions cannot subtract from the rights guaranteed
by the United States Constitution, state constitutions can and often do
provide additional rights for their citizens. The federal constitution sets
the floor for individual rights; state constitutions establish the ceiling.
125. Cf State v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808, 812-13 (Wash. 1986) (en banc). The court sets
forth six criteria for determining whether the state's constitution extends broader rights to
citizens than does the United States Constitution. Id.
126. Osban v. State, 726 S.W.2d 107, 120 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986)(Miller, J., dissenting).
When Texas joined the Union, it carried over its written principles from the period of 1836 to
1846, when Texas was an independent nation. Id.
127. The Declaration of Rights in the 1836 Constitution of the Republic of Texas in-
cluded the Texas equal protection clause. The fourteenth amendment, which incorporated an
equal rights clause into the United States Constitution, was passed in 1868.
128. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 3.
129. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
130. LeCroy v. Hanlon, 713 S.W.2d 335, 338-39 (Tex. 1986).
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Recently, state courts have not hesitated to look to their own constitu-
tions to protect individual rights. This court has been in the main-
stream of this movement. 
131
Federal and state constitutional law are allowed to be separate. For
example, the United States Supreme Court declined to rule on the
constitutionality of a Texas municipal ordinance because the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals might have reached the judgment on in-
dependent grounds under the Texas Constitution.
132
Texas can reject federal holdings and tests in formulating its own
constitutional law, as long as federally protected rights are not vio-
lated. 133 Texas courts are not bound by the decisions of the United
States Supreme Court in that they are "free to accept or reject federal
holdings" in formulating a body of law under the state's own constitu-
tion. 134 "Subject to adhering to minimal federal standards, we are at
liberty to interpret state statutes in light of our own constitution and
to fashion our own tests to determine a statute's constitutionality." 135
The Texas equal protection provision has been interpreted more
broadly in some senses than the federal provision. For example,
equality of political rights was protected under section 3.136
Both the Texas and federal equal protection interpretations have
resulted in a mid-level test. Justice Phillips' dissent in Lucas v. United
States referred to three levels of review used under the Texas equal
protection clause.1 37 For the mid-level test, he cited a court of appeals
case applying intermediate scrutiny, under both state and federal con-
stitutions, to a classification based on illegitimacy. 13S The Texas ra-
tional basis test is called the "strict reasonableness" standard. One
commentator has found the Texas "strict reasonableness" test to be a
significantly more searching inquiry than the equal protection rational
basis standard under federal law. 1
39
In terms of applying an equal protection analysis to education in
131. Id. at 338 (citations omitted).
132. City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 293 (1982).
133. Whitworth v. Bynum, 699 S.W.2d 194, 196 (Tex. 1985).
134. Id at 196 (quoting Brown v. State, 657 S.W.2d 797, 799 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983)).
135. Whitworth, 699 S.W.2d at 196-97.
136. Burroughs v. Lyles, 181 S.W.2d 570, 574 (Tex. 1944).
137. 757 S.W.2d 687, 704-05 (Tex. 1988)(Phillips, C.J., dissenting).
138. In the Interest of B.M.N., 570 S.W.2d 493, 498-500 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1978, no writ).
139. J. HARRINGTON, THE TEXAS BILL OF RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY AND LITIGATION
MANUAL 79 (1987). "Whitworth clearly demonstrates that the Texas rational-basis rule is
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Texas, both federal and state authorities indicate that a higher stan-
dard than the federal rational basis test is required. This can be seen
in Hernandez v. Houston Independent School District. 140 Hernandez
applied the federal rational basis test to education. However, the Her-
nandez analysis was rejected in Plyler when the Court reviewed the
same statute and subjected it to heightened scrutiny. The Third
Court of Appeals in Austin later relied on Hernandez in Sullivan v.
University Interscholastic League,"'1 but the Texas Supreme Court re-
versed the court of appeals' decision. 42 This reversal suggests that
more than the federal rational basis test is required.
The court debated these issues in Edgewood. The defendants in
Edgewood argued that the explicit/implicit test used in Rodriguez
should not be applied in Texas. Of course, as the Edgewood plaintiffs
advocated, since the Texas Constitution explicitly speaks of educa-
tion, the Rodriguez test is easily met and education would therefore be
considered guaranteed by the Constitution. Other arguments by the
defendants against using the explicit/implicit test from Rodriguez are
the following:
a. state constitutions include many laws which are usually consid-
ered legislation so the fact that something is mentioned in the state
constitution does not imply that it is a fundamental right. Unlike the
United States Constitution, which is a document of restricted author-
ity and delegated powers, the Texas Constitution does not restrict it-
self to addressing only those areas that are fundamental;
b. even the states that have found their public school finance sys-
tems to be in violation of their respective state constitutions have
largely rejected the explicit/implicit test;
c. the explicit/implicit test would implicate other vital govern-
mental services besides education and dictate state-wide uniformity;
and
d. so much state involvement would violate local autonomy.
The defendants thus urged rejection of the explicit/implicit test but
advocated another position taken in Rodriguez. The nexus test was
actually much closer to what some courts have called the 'strict reasonableness' test which is
similar to middle-tier federal analysis." Id.
140. 558 S.W.2d 121 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin, 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
141. 599 s.W.2d 860, 864 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1980), rev'd in part, aff'd in part, 616
S.W.2d 170 (Tex. 1981).
142. Sullivan v. University Interscholastic League, 616 S.W.2d 170, 173 (Tex. 1981).
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rejected in Rodriguez and defendants wanted the Texas courts to re-
ject the nexus test for education under the Texas Constitution as well.
The nexus test is applied by connecting the need for the right in ques-
tion with the ability to exercise other constitutional guarantees such
as free speech. Though the Edgewood trial court held that such a
connection existed, the Supreme Court did not reach the question. 143
The plaintiffs in Edgewood urged that the nexus test is indeed valid
in a state judicial proceeding which is evaluating the state's legislative
activity in relation to the state's constitution. Furthermore, the con-
cerns of federalism, which the Rodriguez court emphasized, are not
relevant in a state court interpreting state constitutional law.
Plaintiff's other arguments in distinguishing Rodriguez were as
follows:
a. the education provision in the Texas Constitution is directly
linked with the Texas Bill of Rights;
b. Rodriguez criticized the lack of a complete record in that case,
but the Edgewood plaintiffs had provided extensive proof that tremen-
dous numbers of children were not receiving an adequate education;
and
c. the federal constitution is a guarantee of limited federal govern-
ment interference, but the state constitutions are an affirmative grant
of power to state governments.
5. The Edgewood Supreme Court Applied Equal Protection
Analysis
Though the court did not mention equal protection directly, the
decision was analyzed with equal protection concepts. The three
steps in such an analysis are: 1) is a fundamental right implicated or a
suspect classification made, 2) what is the state's rationale for in-
fringement on the right or for the classification, 3) is the state interest
compelling, substantial or rational?
The court scrutinized the state classification of rich and poor dis-
tricts, emphasized the importance of education as a right, and dis-
cussed the merits of the government's rationale for the current laws
on school financing.
143. Edgewood Indep. School Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 398-99 (Tex. 1989).
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a. The Edgewood Court went beyond rational basis.
Had the Texas Supreme Court used the federal rational basis test,
the defendants might have won, because they could offer proof that
the current system of school financing was not totally irrational.
However, even if the Texas Supreme Court had used the federal ra-
tional basis test but relied on the findings of the district court, it
would still have found the system irrational. Using the rational basis
test, the Supreme Court might have merely dismissed the public
school financing issue as "social or economic legislation," which was
the route taken by the court of appeals. The effort made by the state
in providing the Foundation School Program could be offered as evi-
dence that Texas was moving incrementally towards equalized educa-
tion. However, the Supreme Court rejected that theory. The court
stated that:
[t]he legislature's recent efforts have focused primarily on increasing the
state's contributions. More money allocated under the present system
would reduce some of the existing disparities between districts but
would at best only postpone the reform that is necessary to make the
system efficient. A band-aid will not suffice; the system itself must be
changed.'44
The Edgewood court did not use the federal rational basis test nor did
it find for the defendants. The court's holding that the school finance
system was unconstitutional was based instead on violation of the
constitution's efficiency provision. 4 5
b. Strict Scrutiny, Strict Reasonableness and Edgewood
Equal protection analysis looks at the state classification and the
state interest protected by such a classification. The Texas Supreme
Court discussed the classification of wealth in Edgewood.146 The
court found the state classification of poor and rich districts existed.
The court emphasized the importance of equal education for all and
considered the first equal protection factor by determining whether
144. Id at 397.
145. Id. at 398.
146. Id. at 392. "There are glaring disparities in the abilities of the various school dis-
tricts to raise revenues from property taxes because taxable property wealth varies greatly from
district to district .... Because of the disparities in district property wealth, spending per
student varies widely .... Id.
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the state had created a classification.1 47
The second equal protection factor is the analysis of what state in-
terest is protected by such a classification. This involves considera-
tion of the rationale given by the state to justify its classification
scheme. In Edgewood, the state gave two rationales for the school
financing system which results in a classification of poor and rich dis-
tricts. The first rationale was that the system requires local control,
and the second rationale was that the specific constitutional language
authorized school districts. The state argued that Texas was correctly
prioritizing local control over equality of educational opportunity and
equality of tax revenues. Therefore, any resulting inequalities were
not a product of the state. The state argued that local school districts
must be allowed to raise money for schools based on their own needs.
If not, then the school districts would have little or no control over
how that money would be spent. The current system was said to pro-
vide for accountability to the residents of the area. Local financing,
argued the state, was necessary to maintain local control. State-wide
uniformity would preclude local control.
The Supreme Court answered this argument by reasoning that an
equitable system would enhance local control:
An efficient system does not preclude the ability of communities to exer-
cise local control over the education of their children. It requires only
that the funds available for education be distributed equitably and
evenly. An efficient system will actually allow for more local control,
not less.'48
The court did not determine whether the state interest in local con-
trol was compelling or substantial since it rejected the underlying as-
sumption that the existing school financing system enhanced local
control. 149
The second state rationale for the classification of rich and poor
districts was based on the language of article VII, section 3 which
grants the legislature the power to create school districts. The state
argued that school districts were constitutional because they were
written into the Texas Constitution. Furthermore, the current condi-
tions of inequalities which were caused by such local structures must
also have been constitutional, because the current system developed
147. Edgewood Indep. School Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 396-97 (Tex. 1989).
148. Id. at 398.
149. Id.
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from constitutionally approved school districts. In balancing the "ef-
ficiency" clause with the school district clause, the state pointed to the
dates on which the two provisions were adopted. The state argued
that the school district clause should rule because it was adopted in
1883, seven years after the original section 1 "efficiency" clause was
adopted. Lastly, section 3 of article VII had been amended five times
since its adoption. Therefore, the fact that the school district clause
had remained untouched was evidence that the people want the cur-
rent system to continue.
The Supreme Court responded to this argument by saying that arti-
cle VII, section 3 does not excuse the current inequities and that "this
provision was intended not to preclude an efficient system but to serve
as a a [sic] vehicle for injecting more money into an efficient sys-
tem."' 150 The Supreme Court followed traditional constitutional inter-
pretation doctrine by looking at the document as a whole and
balancing the weight of one provision against another.' 5' In balanc-
ing the section 3 clause authorizing school districts with the section 1
efficiency clause, the court found that the school district clause must
be limited in order to make sense of the efficiency clause. 52 The
Supreme Court gave more weight to section I because the language of
section 1 provides that the legislature has the "duty" to maintain an
efficient system of public free schools, while section 3 provides that
the legislature merely has discretionary power and "may" create
school districts.
53
Furthermore, the court reviewed the Texas Constitutional debates
and held that the framers and ratifiers intended a system where the
costs and benefits of public schools were equalized.' "The 1876
Constitution provided a structure whereby the burdens of school taxa-
tion fell equally and uniformly across the state, and each student in
the state was entitled to exactly the same distribution of funds.' 33
Again, the Supreme Court did not directly answer the question
whether the school district structure was a compelling or substantial
state interest. However, the court clearly went beyond the rational
test by exploring classifications made by the government and by ana-
150. Id. at 396.
151. Id. at 393-99.
152. Id
153. Id.
154. Id. at 395-97.
155. Id. at 396.
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lyzing the current application of those classifications.16
The Supreme Court rejected both "rationales" offered by the state.
In doing so it indirectly held these reasons to a higher standard than a
mere rational basis test.
The Texas Supreme Court also explored the importance of educa-
tion. Although the court never said that education was a fundamen-
tal right, the right to education was found to be so important that a
tremendous change in the financing of schools was mandated in
Edgewood. ' " The court took seriously the constitutional requirement
of providing for a general diffusion of knowledge statewide. More-
over, the court found that education must be provided equally to
Texas children: "There must be a direct and close correlation be-
tween a district's tax effort and the educational resources available to
it; in other words, districts must have substantially equal access to
similar revenues per pupil at similar levels of tax effort."'' 5
Had the Edgewood court held that education was a fundamental
right or that wealth was a suspect class, or had the court used a mid-
level standard to review the school financing system, the decision
would not have upset precedent in Texas constitutional history. The
history of fundamental rights in Texas follows.
6. History of Fundamental Rights In Texas
State judiciaries have traditionally cited to federal authority in ana-
lyzing civil rights. Only recently have state courts begun using the
Texas Constitution and Texas case precedent as the basis for their
decisions in civil rights cases.' 59
Article I of the Texas Constitution contains a section which pro-
vides that the Bill of Rights is "inviolate" and "excepted out of the
general powers of government."'" This would appear to make the
rights within article I fundamental, and all other provisions of the
Constitution nonfundamental, but case law has not drawn such neat
lines.
Texas Jurisprudence 3d identifies less than half of the Bill of Rights
156. Edgewood Indep. School Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 396 (Tex. 1989).
157. Id. at 396-97.
158. Id.
159. See J. HARRINGTON, THE TEXAS BILL OF RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY AND LITIGA-
TION MANUAL 1 (1987).
160. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 29.
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as fundamental, listing section 3a (equality under the law), sections 3,
4 (religious tests), section 7 (sectarian appropriations), section 8 (free-
dom of speech and press), section 12 (habeas corpus), section 13
(cruel and unusual punishment; due course of law), section 15 (trial
by jury), section 16 (bills of attainder), section 17 (special privileges),
section 21 (corruption of blood), section 24 (military authority), sec-
tion 25 (quartering soldiers) and section 27 (assembly and petition).
1 61
This list is both over-inclusive and under-inclusive. It is over-inclu-
sive in that some of the rights have not been challenged, such as quar-
tering soldiers in times of peace. The list is under-inclusive because
recent cases have expanded the list. In Lucas v. United States,1 62 the
Texas Supreme Court declared a statutory limitation on medical mal-
practice damages to be unconstitutional as it violated the "open
courts" provision of article 1, section 13 of the Texas Constitution. 
63
The use of a strict scrutiny test that demanded the government prove
a compelling reason for the malpractice cap established the "open
courts" guarantee as a fundamental right.
A right to privacy was implied from several constitutional provi-
sions and a strict scrutiny standard was used in Texas State Employ-
ees Union v. Texas Dept. of Mental Health & Mental Retardation. 164
The Texas right to privacy is discussed further in the section on appli-
cation of the proposed test for fundamental rights to reproductive
rights.
Equal protection in the Texas Constitution is addressed in two pro-
visions, sections 3 and 3a of article 1.165 Section 3 is the older of the
two, and was the first section in the 1836 Constitution's Declaration
of Rights.1 66 Two recent cases have interpreted section 3 using "the
161. See 12 TEX. JUR. 3d Constitutional Law § 113 (1979).
162. 757 S.W.2d 687 (Tex. 1988).
163. Id.; see also TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 13. "All courts shall be open, and every person
for an injury done him, in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due
course of law." Id.
164. 746 S.W.2d 203, 205 (Tex. 1987). The court held that mandatory polygraph tests of
Texas mental health and mental retardation employees violated the right of individual privacy
which was found implicit in the Texas Bill of Rights. Id. Although the state's concern with
the welfare of the mentally ill and mentally retarded was "in many respects compelling" and
"admittedly important," the unreliability of the polygraphs made this method an unreasonable
means for identifying violations by employees. Id. at 206.
165. TEX. CONST. art. I, §§ 3, 3a.
166. J. HARRINGTON, THE TEXAS BILL OF RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY AND LITIGATION
MANUAL 77, 91(1987).
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Texas version of the rational basis test."' 67 In Whitworth v. Bynum,16
the Texas Supreme Court invalidated the automobile guest statute by
analyzing how other states had resolved similar challenges to their
guest statutes, by imposing higher constitutional standards than those
required by federal law, and by relying on only the authority of Texas
cases. 169 The "no pass, no play" provision of the Texas Education
Code was upheld in Spring Branch IS.D. v. Stamos.7 ° The Texas
Supreme Court found no fundamental rights implicated nor any sus-
pect class burdened by the statute which required students to pass
academic courses in order to participate in school sports activities. 7'
The second provision, section 3a, called the Texas ERA amend-
ment, has survived scrutiny as a fundamental right and was re-af-
firmed recently.'72 The amendment brings the strict scrutiny
standard to governmental classifications of "sex, race, color, creed, or
national origin."'13 Age classification was implicitly denied protec-
tion under this section.' 74 Sexual orientation and wealth classifica-
tions have not been specifically addressed under the amendment.
7. What Other States Have Done
a. Education as a Fundamental Right in Other States
Since 1971, at least twenty of the highest courts in states other than
Texas have been called upon to review the constitutionality of their
school finance systems. The following states found education to be a
fundamental right: Arizona, California, Connecticut, Kentucky,
West Virginia and Wyoming. 75 Four states found that their systems
violated the equal protection clause: Arkansas, California, Washing-
167. See Whitworth v. Bynum, 699 S.W.2d 194, 196-97 (Tex. 1985) ("rational basis" test
applied to strike down Texas Guest Statute); Spring Branch I.S.D. v. Stamos, 695 S.W.2d 556,
559-60 (Tex. 1985) ("rational basis" test applied to uphold "no pass, no play" rule).
168. 699 S.W.2d 194, 196-97 (Tex. 1985).
169. Id. at 195-98; J. HARRINGTON, THE TEXAS BILL OF RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY
AND LITIGATION MANUAL 78, 79 (1987).
170. Spring Branch I.S.D. v. Stamos, 695 S.W.2d 556, 562 (Tex. 1985).
171. Id. at 560.
172. In the Interest of McLean, 725 S.W.2d 696, 697-98 (Tex. 1987).
173. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 3a.
174. Texas Woman's Univ. v. Chayklintaste, 530 S.W.2d 927, 928 (Tex. 1975).
175. Shofstall v. Hollins, 515 P.2d 590, 592 (Ariz. 1973) (en banc); Serrano v. Priest, 487
P.2d 1241, 1255-58 (Cal. 1971); Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359, 373 (Conn. 1977); Rose v.
Council for Better Educ. Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 205 (Ky. 1989); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d
859, 878 (W. Va. 1979); Washakie County School Dist. No. 1. v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 333
(Vyo. 1980).
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ton and Wyoming. 176
b. Other States' Application of Mid-Level Review Under State
Constitutions
Other states have used the mid-level review in protecting rights
other than education under their state constitutions. The intermedi-
ate level analysis has been used to invalidate classifications based on
wealth as a suspect category. For example, the Washington Supreme
Court held that a statute which denied indigent criminal defendants
credit for time served in jail between the defendant's arrest and guilty
plea denied equal protection since it created a "classification based
solely on wealth.' ' 77 The court pointed out that even though the de-
fendant's right to such credit was nonfundamental, "where depriva-
tion of liberty is due to a defendant's indigency ... the application of
some enhanced standard of review seems even more clear.'
78
Similarly, a wealth-based statute which required retired judges to
choose between a pension and the continued practice of law after re-
tirement was struck down in Maryland.'7 9 The argument that the
statute was valid because it served the legitimate purpose of saving the
taxpayers' money was rejected.'
8 0
Classifications by gender have also been protected in the state
courts under the mid-level review under state constitutions. In Michi-
gan, the ban of female students from a basketball program was found
to be a violation of equal protection using the intermediate
standard. " 8
There are other instances of state statutes being held to a mid-level
review. 18 2 For example, the Alaska Supreme Court has established a
176. Dupree v. Alma School Dist., 651 S.W.2d 90, 93 (Ark. 1983); Serrano v. Priest, 487
P.2d 1241, 1260 (Cal. 1971); Seattle School Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978);
Herschler, 606 P.2d at 310.
177. State v. Phelan, 671 P.2d 1212, 1215 (Wash. 1983).
178. Id.
179. Attorney Gen. v. Waldron, 426 A.2d 929, 954 (Md. App. 1981).
180. Id. at 951.
181. Department of Civil Rights v. Waterford Township Dept., 387 N.W.2d 821, 829
(Mich. 1986).
182. See, e.g., Leliefeld v. Johnson, 659 P.2d 111, 126 (Idaho 1982) (applying focus analy-
sis); Commonwealth v. Bell, 516 A.2d 1172, 1178 (Penn. 1986) (applied intermediate standard
in upholding state statute); State v. Cook, 679 P.2d 413, 414-15 (Wash. App. 1984) (applying
intermediate standard to pretrial detainees); Hanson v. Williams County, 389 N.W.2d 319, 323
(N.D. 1986) (finding state statute of repose unconstitutional using intermediate review).
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"sliding scale" standard. 18 3 The court commented: "In contrast to
the rigid tiers of federal equal protection analysis, we have postulated
a single sliding scale of review ranging from relaxed scrutiny to strict
scrutiny. The applicable standard of review for a given case is to be
determined by the importance of the individual rights asserted and by
the degree of suspicion with which we view the resulting classification
scheme."'" Montana also articulated a sliding scale test and con-
demned drawing arbitrary lines.18 5
The foregoing part of this article examined the Edgewood argu-
ments and decisions within the historical context of federal and state
constitutional laws. This final section of the article reaches into the
future. Using the Edgewood debates on education as a fundamental
right and wealth as a suspect classification, the authors postulate a
three-factor test for fundamental rights under the Texas Constitution
and apply the test briefly to four areas of current human need: higher
education, indigent health care, shelter and reproductive rights.
III. PROPOSED TEST FOR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS UNDER THE
TEXAS CONSTITUTION
The following are proposed factors to be weighed in determining
the depth of value that a particular constitutional provision has to the
people of Texas: 1) history; 2) language; and 3) importance to the
people. None of the factors is dispositive; for example, if a new right
is created by the judiciary or legislative branches, the history factor
should not be used to automatically discredit the fundamental quality
of the new right. However, each factor is important and should be
weighed.
A. History: How Long the Topic Has Been in the Constitution
A constitution is a document that contains the most basic, enduring
values of a society. A constitution is general because it presents a
wide perspective on the balance of powers between the branches of a
government and the balance of power between the people and the gov-
ernment. A constitution presents a system of fundamental princi-
183. State v. Ostrosky, 667 P.2d 1184, 1192-93 (Alaska 1983), appeal dismissed, 467 U. S.
1201 (1984).
184. Id.
185. Butte Community Union v. Louis, 712 P.2d 1309, 1313-14 (Mont. 1986).
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ples.' 86 A constitution differs from a statute in several ways. A
statute is more specific, giving concrete details. A statute is also inter-
preted differently, with the most recent changes in the statute given
greater validity over earlier versions.
The differences in statutes and constitutions should lead to different
interpretations of the two types of law. After generations have in ef-
fect re-validated portions of the constitution by not deleting certain
provisions, those provisions are affirmed as having lasting value.
Although statutory interpretation usually places more weight on the
more recent changes, the length of time that a provision persists in a
constitution should add weight to an interpretation of that provision.
The historical part of the proposed fundamental rights test was ap-
plied to education in Texas during the arguments in Edgewood. The
Texas Constitution has been amended many times, yet the education
provision has remained since at least 1845. The provision which man-
dates public schools, article VII, section 1, has been affirmatively al-
lowed to survive proposed amendments.1 7 Generations of Texas
voters have reaffirmed that public education is a basic value. There-
fore, the provision should be interpreted as having more value to the
people than a provision which has been deleted, recently added or
constantly amended.
The defendants in Edgewood argued that the constitutional provi-
sions should be governed by rules on statutory interpretation. Be-
cause a provision relating to the formation of school districts was
placed in the Texas Constitution more recently than the section pro-
viding for an efficient system of public free schools, the defendants
argued that current inequalities which are the result of local school
district control cannot be attacked through the use of the older consti-
tutional provision. This view of the-newer-the-better overlooks the
common sense notion that the people of Texas have for generations
considered education to be of utmost importance. None of the origi-
nal three proposals before the Texas Constitutional Convention of
1875 offered options that included districting or local taxation for
schools.' The 1845 version of the Texas Constitution did not in-
clude provisions for school districts. In 1869, the legislature was
186. 16 AM. JUR. 2d Constitutional Law §§ 1, 3 (1979).
187. In 1976, a proposal to amend § I of article VII was rejected by the voters.
188. S. McKAY, DEBATES IN THE TEXAS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1875, at
243-45 (1930).
[Vol. 22:69
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN TEXAS
given authority to provide for taxation within school districts "if nec-
essary," but the 1876 version of the Texas Constitution did not pro-
vide for either school districts or the capacity for school districts to
tax.19 The early Constitution presented the basic value of wide-
spread, accessible, and equal education. Later generations grappled
with methods of financing but never rejected the basic value. The
framers and ratifiers could not have foreseen the future complexity of
financing education, nor the huge imbalance that was to occur in the
distribution of wealth across the state.
B. Language Used in the Constitution
A primary step in constitutional interpretation is to give the written
words their plain meaning, and only begin casting about for further
meaning when an ambiguity or mistake appears. 9° The "plain mean-
ing" rule is described by Professor Antineau in his treatise on consti-
tutional interpretation as requiring:
at least some respect for those who framed and adopted the organic law,
and it has often been said by the judiciary that when the language of a
constitution provides a clear, plain meaning which does not contradict
any other provision of the organic law, or result in a ruling that is mani-
festly unjust or absurd, the plain meaning of the language is to be ap-
plied and there is no room for judicial construction.191
The specific words used in the Texas Constitution provide weights
in the scale used to interpret the various provisions. The underlying
values to which the Constitution gives expression are contained in the
Texas Bill of Rights. Article I begins with the following phrase,
"That the general, great and essential principles of liberty and free
government may be recognized and established, we declare." 192 It fol-
lows that if the language used in a particular provision is also used in
the Bill of Rights, then there is a reference to the other fundamental
values expressly guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, such as free speech
and civic participation. The words "freedom," "liberty," "rights"
and "equality" should be scrutinized to see if they were intended as
references to the basic values.
Other words are also significant. The use of "shall" and "duty"
189. TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 3 (1869).
190. C. ANTIEAU, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION 3 (1982).
191. Id.
192. TEX. CONST. art. I.
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present a higher obligation than provisions for what the legislature
"may" do. The word "may" used in conjunction with legislative ap-
proval for local means of funding can mean that a duty of the legisla-
ture is being delegated to a local entity.
Each provision should then be read in light of the entire Constitu-
tion. The fact that a specific article is devoted to a particular topic,
such as education, weighs in favor of fundamentalism.
Interpretation of a state constitution is complicated by the varied
contents, some of which embody general, fundamental values and
others which, like a statute, contain details of a concrete, practical
nature. The language factor of the proposed test for fundamental
rights in Texas provides a means by which to distinguish the two.
Applying the language factor of the proposed test to education as a
fundamental right under the Texas Constitution, we see the following:
1. a clear reference to the Bill of Rights is made by the use of the
words "liberties" and "rights" ("[a] general diffusion of knowledge
being essential to the preservation of the liberties and rights of the
people..."), 193 and the language of article VII, section 1 creates an
explicit link between education and universally recognized fundamen-
tal rights;
2. the legislature is given a high obligation to support and maintain
the schools by the use of the words "shall" and "duty" ("it shall be
the duty of the Legislature ...");191
3. the plain meaning of the words of article VII, section 1 clearly
state that a system of public free schools is to be established and main-
tained ("to establish and make suitable provision for the support and
maintenance of an efficient system of public free schools"); 195
4. education has an article (article VII) devoted entirely to the
topic. 196
C. Importance to the People
The importance of education to the people must be measured both
inside and outside the Constitution. The nexus argument which rec-
ognizes a logical connection between fundamental rights and the
rights necessary for the exercise of the fundamental right should be
193. TEx. CONST. art. VII, § 1.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. TEx. CONS. art. VII.
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made at the state level. This rationale is based on the history of feder-
alism and state constitutions as affirmative grants of power. The em-
phasis on a particular right within a state constitution can also be
measured by whether funding is made available in the same constitu-
tion for that right. Furthermore, the current portion of state and lo-
cal budgets which supports the right or benefit gives an indication of
its importance to the people of Texas.
The nexus argument begins with fundamental rights expressly rec-
ognized in the constitution. Logically, protection of fundamental
rights must include protection of adjacent rights which are necessary
for the exercise of the already protected rights. For example, the trial
court in Edgewood called education "a guardian of other important
rights."' 97 The nexus argument was rejected in Rodriguez but has
been used by other state courts in their decisions on school financ-
ing.' 98 Education was described as "the essential prerequisite that al-
lows our citizens to be able to appreciate, claim and effectively realize
their established rights."' 199 It was said to be "most assuredly a right
without which other constitutionally guaranteed rights would have
little meaning.
20 0
Delineation of a fundamental right is also affected by influences
outside the language of the constitution itself. Some of these extratex-
tual factors include the development of technology, which has con-
fronted our society with a dizzying array of medical-ethical problems;
changing social mores, which have provided women with many more
options, both personally and professionally, than ever before; and
rapid developments in the fields of sociology, statistics, economics,
international relations, psychology, medicine, and computer science,
which are constantly forcing us to reevalute our views of human
rights. These shifting societal influences require our Texas Constitu-
tion to evolve as well, as the supreme court indicated in Edgewood.
What can we look to in deciding how state constitutional law
should evolve? One excellent authority is the Universal Declaration
197. Record at 538, Edgewood (No. 362, 516).
198. See, e.g., Dupree v. Alma School Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90, 93 (Ark. 1983);
Helena Elem. School Dist. v. Montana, No. AD-85-370 (Montana 1st Jud. Dist., Lewis and
Clark County, Jan. 13, 1988).
199. Dupree, 651 S.W.2d at 93.
200. Helena Elem. School Dist. v. Montana, No. AD-85-370 (Montana 1st Jud. Dist.,
Lewis and Clark County, Jan. 13, 1988).
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of Human Rights,2°' a document which represents cross-cultural and
cross-national thinking. The United States took an active role in the
creation of this document. Our federal Bill of Rights is mirrored in
the Universal Declaration's guarantees of freedom of speech, religion
and assembly. Slavery and arbitrary arrest or detention are prohib-
ited, and freedom of movement is protected. The Declaration goes
further than the Bill of Rights, however, by explicitly including the
fulfillment of basic needs as a human right.
Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health
and well-being of himself and his family, including food, clothing, hous-
ing, medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security
in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age
or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.2"2
Logically, using the nexus argument, political rights are not avail-
able to people whose needs are not met. As a covenant of the United
Nations expressed, "[T]he enjoyment of civil and political freedoms
and of economic, social and cultural rights are interconnected and
interdependent.... [W]hen deprived of economic, social and cultural
rights man does not represent the human person whom the Universal
Declaration regards as the ideal of the free man.
'20 3
The state constitutions are the charters under which we can claim
these rights because historically the federal Constitution grants the
states the power to protect these rights. In fact, the Rodriguez court
rejected the nexus argument, not because the argument lacked logical
consistency, but because the Court was concerned about preserving
federalism and the states' historical role in protecting human rights.
Lastly, beyond the nexus argument, is the analysis of the current state
and local budget as an indicator of what Texans view as important.
The third factor of the proposed test for fundamental rights under
the Texas Constitution was seen in the arguments of counsel in
Edgewood. Three arguments were presented by the state defendants
in opposition to the analysis of education as important to the people.
The first argument was that many things are in the constitution that
are not fundamental. Another was that social and economic legisla-
201. Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, G.A. Res. 217A. (III) U.N. Doc.
A810 (1948).
202. Id. at 70.
203. H. TOLLEY, THE U.N. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 25 (1987) (quoting U.N.
Doc. E/CN 4/1986/43 and Annex).
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tion should not be subject to strict scrutiny. Third was that funda-
mental rights are rights that do not depend upon public financial
support for their existence.
In response to the first argument concerning the difficulty in sepa-
rating fundamental and nonfundamental constitutional provisions,
the "importance-to-the-people" factor is useful. The very admission
of Texas into the Union was predicated on Texas having a public
school system.' 4 The topic of education was extremely important to
the framers and ratifiers of the Texas Constitution. °5
The second argument was that courts should abstain from ruling on
social or economic issues. The history of this argument goes back to
Franklin Delano Roosevelt and the Great Depression.2° As the legis-
lative and executive branches of the government passed and enforced
progressive government controls, such as wage controls, social secur-
ity and anti-monopoly measures, the judiciary branch invalidated
such measures.2 °7 The political tension between a Court that had
been appointed by prior conservative administrations and the New
Dealers was ultimately resolved, not by Roosevelt's Court-packing
plan, but by the Court excusing itself from responsibility over state
social and economic legislation. 20 8 By 1937, the Supreme Court had
begun its abandonment of substantive due process as a check on state
economic and social legislation. 2°9 The Court used federalism as the
rationale for allowing states to govern their own social and economic
spheres.210 Such a separation of powers may still be necessary at the
federal judiciary level. However, the state judiciary does not have the
same impetus for such restraint, especially in Texas, where judges are
elected, rather than appointed for life as in the federal courts.
The third argument was the argument of affirmative and negative
rights. Due to concerns of federalism and the constitutional limita-
tions on the federal government in the United States Constitution,
204. S. MCKAY, DEBATES IN THE TEXAS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1875, at
328 (1930).
205. Id. at 198.
206. P. BREST & S. LEVINSON, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 287-
305 (1983).
207. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 313-17 (1936); United States v.
Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 63-65 (1936); Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 540-
43 (1935).
208. See R. MCCLOSKY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 164-65 (1960).
209. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 397-400 (1937).
210. See Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236, 243 (1941).
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federal fundamental rights have been interpreted in dicta as requiring
the federal government to refrain from acting.2" The same rights
have been interpreted as not requiring the federal government to act
affirmatively to provide those rights, especially when the action in-
volves a monetary outlay. This position is logically inconsistent be-
cause whether the government spends money on upholding a certain
right cannot be dispositive. For example, the right to counsel in a
criminal case involves governmental spending. Allowing religious or-
ganizations tax-free statutes also requires, indirectly, government
spending. Public financial support is absolutely necessary for suf-
frage. Even if the federal courts were able to logically distinguish af-
firmative and negative rights, the requirement that a federal
constitution can protect only negative rights would spring from a con-
cern for federalism and a view that the federal constitution protects
rights only by limiting government involvement. State judiciaries,
however, interpret state constitutions under different conditions be-
cause state constitutions contain affirmative grants of power as well as
negative limitations on government interference in people's lives.
Examples of affirmative grants of state governmental power in the
Texas constitution can be found within the Texas Bill of Rights and
also in other articles of the Constitution. The equal rights section
proclaims, "All free men, when they form a social compact, have
equal rights.12 12 The freedom of worship section mandates that "...
it shall be the duty of the Legislature to pass such laws as may be
necessary to protect equally every religious denomination . 213
The bail section provides that "[a]ll prisoners shall be bailable by suffi-
cient sureties. ' 21 4 The right of trial by jury "shall remain inviolate"
according to article I, section 15. Article VI on suffrage requires
much exertion by the government to ensure fair and free elections.
Article VII mandates the government to provide for both higher and
lower education. Article IX provides for hospital districts with the
duty to provide for its "needy inhabitants."
In all the above examples, the state government is given affirmative
power, i.e., the power to expend funds and effort to assure the popula-
211. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 469-80 (1977), Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535,
545-47 (1972); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485-86 (1970).
212. TEx. CONST. art. I, § 3.
213. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 6.
214. TEX. CONST. art I, § 11.
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tion's rights, not just the power to avoid interference in people's exer-
cise of individual rights.
IV. APPLICATION OF THE PROPOSED TEST FOR FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHTS UNDER THE TEXAS CONSTITUTION TO OTHER
MATTERS NOT MENTIONED IN THE BILL OF
RIGHTS
To further explicate the proposed test, it will be applied to four
areas in the following sections. This is not meant to be conclusive, but
rather to open the door to further research and study in the explora-
tion of the term "fundamental right" under a state constitution.
A. Applying the Proposed Test for Fundamental Rights to Higher
Education
In terms of history, language, and importance to the people, higher
education could be considered a possible fundamental right under the
Texas Constitution.
1. History
Under the proposed test for determining whether a particular right
is fundamental, it is clear higher education and equal educational op-
portunity meet the test's criteria. First, the founders created an insti-
tution of higher learning in Texas' fourth constitution in 1866, and
education was one of the proffered reasons for Texas' Declaration of
Independence from Mexico in 1836. Furthermore, funding for higher
education is guaranteed in the Texas Constitution through the crea-
tion of the Permanent University Fund in 1866.
2. Language
The constitution requires the creation of a "University of the first
class."'2 15 The education clause interpreted in Edgewood can apply to
the higher education system as well. The language of the constitution
creating the Permanent University Fund displays the importance of
education in a constitutional sense.
3. Importance to the People
A higher education system is as much a prerequisite of success in
215. TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 10.
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today's world as public education was to the founders and framers of
our constitution. The public recognition of that importance is re-
flected in the Texas budget which expends one-sixth of its funds in
higher education (approximately ten billion per biennium). Higher
education facilities are an important generator of high-technology
growth.
Article 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on educa-
tion provides, in part, "Everyone has the right to education. Educa-
tion shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages.
Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and profes-
sional education shall be made equally accessible to all on the basis of
merit.
,2 16
B. Applying the Proposed Test for Fundamental Rights to Indigent
Health Care
1. History
Counties are created, and their powers and duties described, in arti-
cle IX of the Texas Constitution. Section 4 of article IX was adopted
in 1954 and allows the legislature to create hospital districts. These
districts have the responsibility for the medical care of the county's
indigent residents. "[P]rovided further, that such Hospital District
shall assume full responsibility for providing medical and hospital
care to needy inhabitants of the county.... 217
Section 9 of article IX repeats the same language in a paragraph
that further describes the operation, powers and duties of hospital dis-
tricts. Section 9 was adopted in 1962 and amended in 1966. Both
versions contained the above language on the duty of providing health
care to the indigent.
The interpretive commentary in Vernon's Annotated Texas Consti-
tution presents the legislative rationale for creating another level of
bureaucracy for the sole purpose of collecting and spending medical
care funds.
None of the large communities in Texas have sufficient hospitals to
serve fully the needs of both nonpaying and paying cases, and public
hospitalization is a desperate need in Texas, which at the time of the
adoption of the amendment ranked among the lowest states in provid-
216. See supra note 201.
217. TEX. CONST. art. IX, § 4.
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ing hospital facilities for its needy citizens. It was admitted that greater
unification rather than greater diversity was necessary for efficient local
government in Texas, but under the present Constitution such unifica-
tion seemed impossible.. .1.
Another provision within the Texas Constitution gives the legisla-
ture the power to provide for medical care of needy persons out of
state funds.21 9 This section was first adopted in 1933 and it has been
amended eight times. Each amendment increased the ceiling of the
amount budgeted for the fund or expanded the requirements to qual-
ify for aid.
2. Language
The duty to care for the indigent seems to be a state duty.
The Legislature shall have the power ... to provide ... for assistance
grants to needy dependent children and the care-takers of such chil-
dren, needy persons who are totally and permanently disabled because
of a mental or physical handicap, needy aged persons and needy blind
persons.
The Legislature may provide by General Law for medical care, rehabili-
tation and other similar services for needy persons.22°
The duty to provide medical care is transferred to the counties
through the creation of hospital districts. Once the district is created,
it "shall" assume the duty of providing medical care to the needy.
Furthermore, once created, the hospital district has sole responsibility
for using tax monies to provide health care to the indigent. "[N]o
political subdivision or municipality within or having the same
boundaries as the district may levy a tax for medical or hospital care
for needy individuals.... 221
3. Importance to the People
The need for providing health care to the indigent as a necessity for
the exercise of other fundamental rights may be analyzed using the
nexus argument. The rights of freedom of speech and assembly, for
218. See TEX. CONST. art. IX, interp. commentary (Vernon 1955).
219. TEX. CONST. art. III, § 51(a).
220. Id.
221. TEX. CONST. art. IX, § 11. This section is specific to four particular counties but the
same mandate is found in most of the Texas Hospital District provisions. Id.
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example, are not equally available to someone in need of antibiotics,
pain relief or surgery.
Many hospital districts in Texas are currently in serious financial
trouble as medical costs sky-rocket and the poverty of county resi-
dents increases. Much money is spent on indigent care and yet the
need is not being met.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights lists medical care as a
human right.
C. Applying the Proposed Test for Fundamental Rights to Shelter
1. History
In a recent Texas case, Hughes v. Dallas,222 the plaintiffs were suc-
cessful in demanding that counties fulfill their duty to the homeless
population. The cause of action was based on a state statute223 which
placed responsibility for "paupers" on county commissioners courts.
The state constitution has two provisions on caring for the destitute.
Article XI, section 2 asserts, "[T]he establishment of county poor
houses and farms ... shall be provided for by general laws. ' 224 This
provision was first written into the 1875 constitution.225 Article XVI,
section 8 states, "Each county in the State may provide, in such man-
ner as may be prescribed by law, a Manual Labor Poor House and
Farm, for taking care of, managing, employing and supplying the
wants of its indigent and poor inhabitants. ' 226 This provision was
written into the 1869 constitution.227
2. Language
The plain meaning of the above language places the duty to care for
the destitute on counties. Neither of the provisions, however, makes
reference to the Bill of Rights. Article XI does contain the strong
word "shall," expressing obligation. Article XVI is an enabling
clause allowing the counties to raise monies for the indigent.
Although no one article is devoted to the care of the poor, it is men-
tioned in two places in the constitution.
222. Hughes v. Dallas, No. 87-2124 (191st Dist. Court, Dallas County, Oct. 26, 1989).
223. TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 2351 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
224. TEX. CONST. art. XI, § 2.
225. TEX. CONST. art. XI, § 2 (1875).
226. TEX. CoNs'r. art. XVI, § 8.
227. TEX. CoNsT. art. XVI, § 26 (1869).
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3. Importance to the People
Under the nexus argument, the right to shelter is viewed in relation
to its importance in allowing the exercise of established fundamental
rights. The other fundamental rights are meaningless if one is home-
less. Without an address, for example, one cannot even register to
vote.
The amount of state and local money currently being spent on
housing would also indicate how Texas views the importance of shel-
ter. Housing is explicitly mentioned in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, suggesting its fundamental quality.
D. Applying the Proposed Test for Fundamental Rights to
Reproductive Rights
Applying the proposed test for fundamental rights under the Texas
Constitution, we look to the history, language and importance to the
people of the right to choice.228
1. History
The right to an abortion is not explicitly set out in either the state
or federal Constitution. In Roe v. Wade,229 however, the Supreme
Court found abortion to be protected under the right to privacy.230
Roe was a class action challenging the constitutionality of the Texas
criminal abortion laws.231 Although the right to privacy is not ex-
pressly mentioned in the United States Constitution, zones of privacy
have been guaranteed. The origin of the right to privacy has been
found in the first or ninth amendments, in the penumbras of the Bill
of Rights, or in the concept of liberty guaranteed by the first section of
the fourteenth amendment.232
The Texas right to privacy similarly is grounded on a number of
provisions in the Texas Constitution. In a case involving an em-
ployee's right to refuse the employer's demand to submit to a poly-
228. See generally, A. Johnson, Abortion, Personhood, and Privacy in Texas. Unpub-
lished paper read at the University of Texas Symposium on the Texas Constitution, 1989 (his-
tory of abortion rights in Texas).
229. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479, 482-488 (1965).
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graph test,233 the Texas Supreme Court based a zone of privacy on
sections 6, 8, 9, 10, 19, and 25 of article I of the Texas Constitution.
These sections explicitly guarantee freedom of religion and speech,
the right of life and liberty without arbitrary denial, the sanctity of a
home against unreasonable intrusion, and the right against self-in-
crimination. The court clearly states that a compelling governmental
reason is required before intrusions into these areas are permitted,
thereby granting the right to privacy the status of a fundamental right
under the Texas Constitution.
Each of these sections is in article I which is found in the Texas Bill
of Rights. The Bill of Rights states that its provisions are inviolate.234
These sections have not been amended since the original constitution,
except to add the equal rights amendment in 1972.233
There is also a common law history of privacy in Texas. The his-
tory of abortion in Texas, however, is that it was a crime, albeit one
which was seldom prosecuted.236 There is no history to show that
abortion was on the minds of the framers and ratifiers. Though pri-
vacy may have been indirectly intended, certainly women's rights
were not yet respected or protected. The 1876 constitution did not
even give women the right to vote. However, the Texas Equal Rights
Amendment, article I, section 3a, specifically prohibits discrimination
on the basis of sex.
2. Language
There is no explicit language about the right to reproductive choice
in the Texas Constitution. The language upon which the right to pri-
vacy is based, however, is completely within the Bill of Rights in arti-
cle I. Furthermore, the language of article I, section 3a is
unambiguous and strong enough to trigger strict scrutiny.
3. Importance to the People
The importance to the people of the availability of reproductive
choice can be measured by the number of women's deaths resulting
233. Texas State Employees Union v. Department of Mental Health and Mental Retarda-
tion, 746 S.W.2d 203, 205 (Tex. 1987).
234. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 29.
235. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 3a. "Equality under the law shall not be denied or abridged
because of sex, race, color, creed, or national origin." Id.
236. Texas State Employees Union, 746 S.W.2d at 203.
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from illegal abortions before such a procedure was legal, as well as
from the costs of social problems created by forcing unwanted chil-
dren on unwilling parents. However, no part of the Texas budget is
set aside explicitly for abortions, and the morality of abortion contin-
ues to be a thorny and controversial subject.
Because privacy has already been judged to be a fundamental right
under the Texas Constitution,237 the question can be narrowed to
whether reproductive choice, including abortion, is encompassed by
the Texas right to privacy. This question has not yet been reached in
Texas case law.
A problem exists in defining abortion rights solely in terms of pri-
vacy, and not in terms of a right to an abortion as part of the right to
medical care. To define reproductive choice as a privacy matter re-
sults in resurrecting the argument of affirmative and negative rights
referred to earlier in this article. If the government provides for the
fundamental right of reproductive choice only limiting its interference
with the personal right of privacy, then the poor who require govern-
mental assistance for any type of medical care are excluded from hav-
ing a choice. If, however, the government provides affirmative
support for reproductive choice, then funding for those unable to af-
ford an abortion would provide a real choice.
V. CONCLUSION
The Edgewood v. Kirby case has the potential to change much in
Texas. The school financing system will definitely have to be over-
hauled. Additionally, the case stands for another step taken by the
Texas judiciary toward protecting human rights under the state con-
stitution. Although the Texas Supreme Court did not find equality of
opportunity for education to be a fundamental right, the topic is still a
viable issue in the case, and the door is open in the future for such a
finding.
A proposed test for fundamental rights under the Texas Constitu-
tion looks at three factors: the history of the topic within the Texas
constitution and case law, the actual language used in the controlling
provision, and the importance of that value to the people of Texas. In
applying this test to higher education, indigent health care, shelter
and reproductive rights, the authors conclude that state constitutions
237. Id. at 205.
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are affirmative grants of power under which such rights can be
sought. The declaration of a constitutional right as fundamental cer-
tainly has implications for future relationships between the people and
the government. We cannot freeze the concept of fundamental right
because the increasing power and responsibilities of government de-
mands increased protection of individual and collective rights.
